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NOTE
A SUSPENDED DEATH SENTENCE:
HABEAS REVIEW OF EXPEDITED REMOVAL DECISIONS
Lauren Schusterman*
Expedited removal allows low-level immigration officers to summarily order
the deportation of certain noncitizens, frequently with little to no judicial
oversight . Noncitizens with legitimate asylum claims should not find themselves in expedited removal . When picked up by immigration authorities,
they should be referred for a credible fear interview and then for more thorough proceedings .
Although there is clear congressional intent that asylum seekers not be subjected to expedited removal, mounting evidence suggests that expedited removal fails to identify bona fide asylum seekers . Consequently, many of them
are sent back to persecution . Such decisions have weighty consequences, but
they have remained largely immune from judicial review . This is in part due
to a provision of expedited removal, 8 U .S .C . § 1252(e)(2), that prevents the
federal courts from hearing habeas petitions that challenge the decisions
made in expedited removal . Circuit courts are split on whether this provision
violates the Suspension Clause based on diverging interpretations of when
noncitizens become entitled to habeas rights .
This Note argues that, based on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Suspension Clause and the historical purpose of habeas review, noncitizens
who are physically in the territorial United States are entitled to habeas
rights . As a result, 8 U .S .C . § 1252(e)(2) is unconstitutional . Asylum seekers
in the United States are entitled to habeas review of their expedited removal
determinations unless Congress enacts an adequate substitute for this review .
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INTRODUCTION
“The expedited removal system is flawed; it does not account for the realities
of immigration  .  .  .  . The system is also cruel; it gambles with the lives of hundreds of thousands of people per year by offering few procedural safeguards .
We can, and should, do better .”
—Judge Pregerson 1

In 2012, Elena fled Honduras. 2 Gang members murdered one of her
brothers because he was gay, killed another brother because he refused to
join the gang, and shot her sister when she refused a gang leader’s advances
after being raped and impregnated by him. 3 A different gang member pur-

1. United States v. Peralta-Sanchez, 847 F.3d 1124, 1146 (9th Cir. 2017) (Pregerson,
C.J., dissenting).
2. Sarah Stillman, When Deportation Is a Death Sentence, NEW YORKER (Jan. 8, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/15/when-deportation-is-a-death-sentence
[https://perma.cc/9FTL-CR26].
3 . Id .

February 2020]

Habeas Review of Expedited Removal Decisions

657

sued Elena and, when she rejected him, shot at her house. 4 When she learned
that this gang member was planning further retaliation against her, she decided to flee Honduras and head to the United States for safety. 5 When Elena
crossed into Texas, she told a Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) agent that
“she feared for her life.” 6
Because Elena expressed a fear of returning home, she could not be deported without first having a “credible fear” interview to prove that she had a
significant probability of successfully claiming asylum. Elena, like others
who have fled persecution, had a legal right to apply for asylum in the United States. 7 To qualify for asylum, a person must show that they have “a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 The asylum officer made a negative credible fear determination, finding that Elena did not
have a “credible fear,” because during her interview she said that her fear was
not on account of one of these protected grounds. 9 While her claim likely fell
under the protected particular social group category, she probably did not
understand what that term meant at the time. 10 Given the complexity of asylum law, which can confound even trained asylum lawyers, it is not plausible
that unrepresented asylum seekers will be able to understand and answer
these questions accurately. 11 After failing her credible fear interview, Elena
requested review of the determination by an immigration judge (IJ). 12 Three
months later, Elena finally had her hearing, conducted via video conference,
which consisted of only one question before the IJ affirmed the asylum officer’s decision. 13 Without recourse to further judicial review, she was subjected to expedited removal and deported two weeks later. 14

4 . Id .
5 . Id .
6 . Id .
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2012) (“Any alien who is physically present in the United
States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and
including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters), irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for asylum . . . .”).
8. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(A).
9. Stillman, supra note 2.
10 . Cf . Miriam Jordan, Her Husband’s Killers Told Her She Was Next . These Days, That’s
Not Enough for Asylum ., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/07/us
/asylum-aclu-migrants-border.html [https://perma.cc/T8FE-EXSV] (“The officer, who conducted the interview over the phone, determined that Irene had not proved a ‘credible fear’ of
persecution if she returned home. Irene was dumbstruck. What was their definition of fear?”).
11 . See KATHRYN SHEPHERD & ROYCE BERNSTEIN MURRAY, AM. IMMIGRATION
COUNCIL, THE PERILS OF EXPEDITED REMOVAL 2 (2017), https://www.americanimmigration
council.org/sites/default/files/research/the_perils_of_expedited_removal_how_fast-track
_deportations_jeopardize_detained_asylum_seekers.pdf [https://perma.cc/9M3A-AUKS].
12. Stillman, supra note 2.
13 . Id .
14 . Id .
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Elena’s story is not unique. Hundreds of thousands of immigrants each
year are subject to expedited removal. 15 Created as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), the expedited removal process streamlines deportations at the border by allowing
low-level immigration officers to summarily deport nearly anyone who arrives without proper entry documents. 16 In the name of efficiency, immigrants are stripped of their due process rights to challenge their removal
orders in court. 17 Indeed, most of them are never afforded even the paltry
formal procedural protections that Elena received. 18
Elena was able to forestall the expedited removal process because she
expressed a fear of persecution. She was flagged as an asylum seeker and, accordingly, granted a credible fear interview, as required under section 235 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 19 But as her experience demonstrates, the mere promise of procedural safeguards is insufficient. Immigrants like Elena, whose asylum claims are deemed not credible, find
themselves subject to expedited removal and imminent deportation. 20 This
streamlined process has sacrificed accuracy for efficiency and resulted in the
erroneous deportation of an incalculable number of bona fide asylum seekers. 21 Subsequent events made clear that Elena was a bona fide asylum seeker. After being deported back to Honduras, she faced the exact persecution
she had feared. 22 She was tortured by the gang member who had targeted her
previously, and “[o]ther gang members cracked her thirteen-year-old son’s
skull.” 23 She fled to the United States again, and that time, immigration authorities agreed that she had a credible fear based on a protected ground. 24
But because of her previous deportation order, Elena was barred from apply15. AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, A PRIMER ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL 3 (2017) [hereinafter PRIMER ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL], https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites
/default/files/research/primer_on_expedited_removal.pdf [https://perma.cc/8D9C-YTF6].
16 . See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
104-208, § 302, 110 Stat. 3009-546, -579 to -84; Brief of Refugee & Human Rights Organizations & Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 25, Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 137 S. Ct. 1581 (2017) (No. 16-812) [hereinafter Brief of Refugee & Human Rights
Organizations & Scholars]; PRIMER ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL, supra note 15, at 2 (explaining
that, by law, expedited removal may not be applied to U.S. citizens, green card holders, refugees, asylees, or asylum seekers).
17. JOSE MAGAÑA-SALGADO,
FAIR TREATMENT DENIED: THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION’S TROUBLING ATTEMPT TO EXPAND “FAST-TRACK” DEPORTATIONS 1–3
(2017),
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/2017-06-05_ilrc_report_fair
_treatment_denied_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SFH-LAAR].
18 . See Stillman, supra note 2.
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (2012).
20 . See id . § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I).
21 . See Brief of Refugee & Human Rights Organizations & Scholars, supra note 16, at
25.
22 . See Stillman, supra note 2.
23 . Id .
24 . Id .
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ing for asylum. Instead, she would have to meet the higher showing required
for withholding of removal. 25 In a sense, Elena was one of the lucky ones.
Many asylum seekers who are erroneously subjected to expedited removal
“never get [this] second chance to prove their claims.” 26
If Elena had access to judicial review to challenge the IJ’s determination
before being subjected to expedited removal, she likely would not have faced
further persecution before her credible fear was recognized. Typically, a detained person has a constitutional right under the Suspension Clause to challenge the cause of their detention before a federal court by filing a habeas
petition. 27 The Suspension Clause, found in Article I of the Constitution,
provides that the right to habeas review may not be suspended except “when
in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”28 Nevertheless, in the absence of a rebellion or invasion, a provision of the IIRIRA, 8
U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2), the “jurisdiction-stripping provision,” essentially nullifies this right by allowing habeas review of only a very narrow set of issues in
the expedited removal process. 29 Unfortunately for Elena, habeas review of
the “substantive and procedural soundness” of the credible fear determinations made in expedited removal is explicitly barred. 30 Congress may only
suspend habeas review in this way if either (1) noncitizens in expedited removal do not have Suspension Clause protections or (2) Congress has enacted an adequate and effective substitute for habeas review. 31
Circuit courts are split as to whether noncitizens in expedited removal
are entitled to habeas rights and whether the jurisdiction-stripping provision
of the IIRIRA is constitutional. 32 The Third Circuit has adopted a case-bycase approach, in which the court looks at the noncitizen’s connection to the
United States to determine access to habeas rights. 33 In contrast, the Ninth
Circuit adopted a bright-line rule: all asylum seekers within the borders of
the United States, even recent, surreptitious entrants, are entitled to the Suspension Clause’s protection. 34
This Note argues that asylum seekers who are subjected to expedited
removal after failing their credible fear interviews are entitled to the protec-

25 . Id .
26 . Id .
27 . See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305, 308 (2001).
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
29 . See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) (2012).
30 . See id .; Castro v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 427–28 (3d Cir. 2016).
31 . See Castro, 835 F.3d at 445; Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977).
32. This Note focuses on individuals seeking asylum who have failed their credible fear
interviews. Throughout this Note, this population is interchangeably referred to as “noncitizens” or “asylum seekers.”
33 . See Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 893 F.3d 153, 170 n.13 (3d Cir. 2018);
Castro, 835 F.3d at 449.
34. Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1117 (9th Cir.), cert .
granted, 140 S. Ct. 427 (2019).
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tion of the Suspension Clause. Thus, the jurisdiction-stripping provision is
unconstitutional because expedited removal does not provide an adequate
substitute for habeas review. Part I provides a broad overview of expedited
removal and the Suspension Clause. Part II analyzes the historical purpose of
the Suspension Clause, the Court’s habeas precedent, and the policy concerns associated with restricted habeas review in expedited removal, and argues in favor of adopting the Ninth Circuit’s approach to entitlement to
habeas review. Finally, Part III explores the required scope of habeas review
and discusses ways to modify expedited removal so that it can be an adequate substitute for habeas review.
I.

THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE AND ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL
PROCEEDINGS

The goal of providing asylum to genuine refugees appears at times to be
in tension with the goal of efficiently processing the claims of the many
noncitizens who enter the United States every year. 35 In an effort to reconcile
these conflicting goals, Congress established expedited removal, a process
intended to streamline the deportation of certain noncitizens without legitimate asylum claims. 36 By statute, expedited removal should not apply to asylum seekers who are found to have a credible fear of returning home. 37 But
critics of expedited removal procedures have noted that the system—as currently implemented—often fails to identify those with legitimate asylum
claims, leading to bona fide asylum seekers being sent back to face the persecution from which they fled. 38 Despite the fact that errors would likely be
mitigated by judicial review, a provision of the expedited removal statute
strips federal courts’ jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions challenging the decisions made in expedited removal proceedings. 39 Consequently, the expedited removal regime and the thousands of decisions it generates each year
have largely been immune from judicial review. 40

35 . See Michele R. Pistone & John J. Hoeffner, Rules Are Made to Be Broken: How the
Process of Expedited Removal Fails Asylum Seekers, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 167, 168 (2006) (“The
history of the development of expedited removal makes clear that the inherent conflict between
speedy decision-making and accurate and fair decision-making was well understood at the
procedure’s inception.”).
36. 142 CONG. REC. 24,783, 24,784 (1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde) (“We recognized
that layering of prolonged administrative and judicial consideration can overwhelm the immigration adjudicatory process, serve as a magnet to illegal entry, and encourage abuse of the asylum process. At the same time, we recommended major safeguards against returning persons
who meet the refugee definition to conditions of persecution.”).
37 . See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012).
38 . See Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 35, at 196 (estimating that annually at least
10,300 bona fide asylum seekers are erroneously deported through expedited removal).
39 . See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(D).
40 . See Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir.
2019) (noting that in 2016, DHS removed 141,000 noncitizens through expedited removal).
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This Part provides an overview of how the Suspension Clause has historically protected noncitizens and how those protections are relevant in evaluating expedited removal proceedings. Section I.A introduces expedited
removal and the limits placed on habeas review. Section I.B analyzes the
Suspension Clause’s purpose and historical application to noncitizens underlying the Court’s more recent habeas cases. Section I.C examines the Court’s
decisions in INS v . St . Cyr 41 and Boumediene v . Bush, 42 which provide the
relevant framework for asylum seekers’ entitlement to habeas review.
A. The Expedited Removal Process
Expedited removal gives discretion to low-level immigration officers to
summarily order the deportation of certain noncitizens—undocumented
noncitizens and those who have presented fraudulent documents to immigration authorities who do not have documentation of continual presence in
the United States for the prior two years. 43 Because expedited removal may
not be used against asylum seekers, CBP officers must flag any noncitizen
who expresses a fear of returning home. 44 Once flagged, these noncitizens
are referred to an asylum officer for a credible fear interview, which seeks to
distinguish legitimate, credible fears from unfounded ones. 45 Noncitizens are
allowed to speak with an attorney prior to (but not during) this interview
and only at personal expense. 46 During the interview, noncitizens who do
not speak English must be provided with an interpreter who speaks their native language. 47
The asylum officer conducting the credible fear interview must determine only whether there is a “significant possibility” that the noncitizen will
ultimately qualify for asylum. 48 Congress meant for credible fear to be a low
standard; 49 historically, pass rates were around 80 percent. 50 But under the
41. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
42. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
43. MAGAÑA-SALGADO, supra note 17, at 1–2.
44. PRIMER ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL, supra note 15, at 4 (noting, however, that in many
cases “government officers failed to ask if the arriving individual feared return”).
45 . Frequently Asked Questions: Asylum Seekers and the Expedited Removal Process,
HUM. RTS. FIRST (Nov. 2015) [hereinafter Asylum Seekers and the Expedited Removal Process],
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/FAQ-asylum-seekers-and-the-expeditedremoval-process.pdf [https://perma.cc/RYD9-S45D].
46 . See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iv) (2012).
47 . See Ingrid Eagly et al., Detaining Families: A Study of Asylum Adjudication in Family
Detention, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 785, 822 (2018).
48 . See Questions & Answers: Credible Fear Screening, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS. (July 15, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/questions
-answers-credible-fear-screening [https://perma.cc/26KH-F7V3].
49 . See 142 CONG. REC. 25,347 (1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“The standard adopted in the conference report is intended to be a low screening standard for admission into the
usual full asylum process.”).
50. Jordan, supra note 10.
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Trump Administration, credible fear passage rates have plummeted, with
record numbers of asylum seekers failing what is meant to be a cursory
screening interview. 51 Noncitizens with a credible fear are spared from expedited removal and placed in regular, more thorough removal proceedings in
front of an IJ pursuant to INA section 240. 52 There, they are able to apply for
asylum as well as other types of relief from deportation, they have a greater
opportunity to obtain counsel and relevant evidence, and they have at least
minimal Fifth Amendment due process protections. 53
In the increasing number of cases in which the asylum officer determines that the noncitizen’s alleged fear lacks credibility, the consequences
are dire. 54 Noncitizens may request that an IJ provide de novo review of the
asylum officer’s finding of no credible fear, but these review hearings are often rushed affairs. They are typically conducted within twenty-four hours of
the initial determination, leaving the noncitizen little time to prepare. 55 On
paper, the hearing is intended to provide noncitizens an opportunity to be
heard and questioned. 56 In reality, the hearing increasingly functions as a
rubber stamp for the asylum officer’s determination. 57 As of June 2018, IJs
affirmed the negative determination in 85.3 percent of cases, up from 67.3
percent just a year prior. 58 In the rare instances in which the IJ disagrees with
the asylum officer and finds a credible fear, the individual is placed in regular
(and more thorough) removal proceedings. 59 But if the IJ agrees, as often
happens, that the individual lacks a credible fear, the noncitizen is quickly
deported. 60 A noncitizen may only file a habeas petition to challenge three
narrow issues: whether they are a noncitizen, whether they were ordered removed pursuant to expedited removal, and whether they have previously
51 . See id .
52. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(B) (2019). See generally Brief of Refugee & Human
Rights Organizations & Scholars, supra note 16, at 3–4 (“[In regular removal proceedings a]
noncitizen may be represented by counsel (at her own expense), may examine the evidence
offered against her, may present additional evidence on her behalf, and may cross examine
government witnesses.” (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A)–(B) (2012))).
53. MAGAÑA-SALGADO, supra note 17, at 2.
54 . See, e .g ., Stillman, supra note 2 (sharing the stories of several individuals who faced
abuse or death after asylum officers deported them back to their home countries).
55 . See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III) (2012); Findings of Credible Fear Plummet amid
Widely Disparate Outcomes by Location and Judge, TRAC IMMIGR. (July 30, 2018),
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/523/#f5) [https://perma.cc/M7G4-YH3A].
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III).
57. Will Weissert & Emily Schmall, ‘Credible Fear’ for U .S . Asylum Harder to Prove Under Trump, CHI. TRIB. (July 16, 2018, 11:10 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news
/nationworld/ct-credible-fear-asylum-20180716-story.html [https://perma.cc/26TS-WDER].
58 . See Findings of Credible Fear Plummet, supra note 55, tbl.1.
59. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(B) (2019) (“If the immigration judge finds that an
alien . . . possesses a credible fear of persecution or torture, the immigration judge shall vacate
the order of the asylum officer . . . and the Service may commence [regular removal proceedings] . . . .”); see also Asylum Seekers and the Expedited Removal Process, supra note 45.
60 . See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A).
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been granted another form of legal status. 61 They may not challenge the asylum officer’s compliance with the required procedures or the factual support
for the “no credible fear” finding. 62 This “cocktail of jurisdictional bars” effectively ensures that factual errors will go uncorrected and agency officials
will not be held accountable for these errors. 63
Without judicial review, there is a very real “danger that an alien with a
genuine asylum claim will be returned to persecution.”64 The constitutionality of the jurisdiction-stripping provision was called into question when asylum seekers facing this danger sought review of their credible fear
determinations by filing habeas petitions in federal district courts. 65 In the
suits that followed, the Third and Ninth Circuits became the first circuit
courts to address the novel question whether these noncitizens are entitled to
the protection of the Suspension Clause and, if so, what the scope of that
right is. 66
B. The Suspension Clause and Its Historical Application to Noncitizens
To determine whether the jurisdiction-stripping provision is constitutional, it is helpful to understand the purpose of the Suspension Clause and
the way noncitizens have historically used habeas review. The Suspension
Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that, absent proper suspension, individuals have a constitutional right to at least minimum review of the lawfulness of their detention. 67 Procedurally, detained individuals may file a
habeas petition, and, if the court grants the writ, they can challenge the legality of their detention in federal court. 68 This review has been viewed as especially critical where the detention is the result of executive action rather than
judicial conviction. 69 At common law, the court’s role in habeas proceedings
“was most extensive in cases of pretrial and noncriminal detention, where
there had been little or no previous judicial review of the cause for deten-

61. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) (2012).
62. Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After Boumediene v.
Bush, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 573–74 (2010).
63. Jennifer Lee Koh, When Shadow Removals Collide: Searching for Solutions to the Legal Black Holes Created by Expedited Removal and Reinstatement, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 338,
343 (2018).
64. H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 158 (1996); see Brief of Refugee & Human Rights
Organizations & Scholars, supra note 16, at 25.
65 . See Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 424, 427, 429 (3d Cir.
2016).
66 . See infra notes 108–110 and accompanying text.
67. Neuman, supra note 62, at 541.
68 . FAQs: What Is Habeas Corpus, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (Oct. 17, 2007),
https://ccrjustice.org/home/get-involved/tools-resources/fact-sheets-and-faqs/faqs-whathabeas-corpus [https://perma.cc/KY34-EUVZ].
69 . See id .

664

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 118:655

tion.” 70 Unlike in criminal proceedings, where there is an adjudicator who is
“disinterested in the outcome and committed to procedures designed to ensure its own independence,” adjudications by the executive lack such formal
protections. 71 The urgency of habeas review in these cases stems from the
purpose of the Suspension Clause: to maintain the separation of powers. 72
Although the Supreme Court has upheld certain limitations on the constitutional rights of noncitizens, those constitutional protections are largely
found in the Bill of Rights. 73 In contrast, the Suspension Clause is found in
the limitations on congressional power. 74 That habeas rights have consistently been extended to noncitizens is reflective of the fundamental proposition
that the separation-of-powers structure requires a judicial check on congressional action as implemented by the executive. 75 Specifically, in the immigration context, the Court has emphasized that “[w]ithin the Constitution’s
separation-of-powers structure, few exercises of judicial power are as legitimate or as necessary as the responsibility to hear challenges to the authority
of the Executive to imprison a person.” 76
Reflecting this core purpose of the Suspension Clause, judicial precedent
dating back to the late 1700s in England and the founding years of the United States establishes that habeas was available to noncitizens. 77 This judicial
review extended to questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact in
deportation decisions. 78 The Court has stated that, at a minimum, the Suspension Clause protects habeas review as it existed at the founding, 79 but has
not foreclosed the possibility that the scope of the Suspension Clause has
since expanded. 80 This history has driven the Court’s analysis of who is entitled to Suspension Clause protections in recent habeas cases involving
noncitizens, 81 leading the Court to conclude that habeas review is a right of
all people, not just citizens. 82
70. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 780 (2008).
71 . Id . at 783; see also Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the
Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 1023 (1998) (“Even where administrative adjudicators are partly insulated from political influence on their decisions, none of them enjoys the
full protections against removal and salary reduction provided for federal judges by Article
III.”).
72 . Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746.
73 . See, e .g ., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990); Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950).
74 . See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
75 . See Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1115 (9th Cir.
2019).
76 . Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797.
77. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 304–06 (2001).
78 . Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1117.
79 . St . Cyr, 533 U.S. at 300–01.
80. Neuman, supra note 62, at 543 (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746).
81 . See, e .g ., Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 893 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2018).
82. Neuman, supra note 62, at 545.
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C. Supreme Court Suspension Clause Jurisprudence in the Context of
Noncitizens
The Supreme Court has addressed the applicability and scope of the
Suspension Clause in relation to noncitizens twice since Congress enacted
expedited removal. 83 These two cases, INS v . St . Cyr and Boumediene v . Bush,
provide “an analytical blueprint” for interpreting the reach of the Suspension
Clause. 84 The first of these cases, St . Cyr, dealt with a lawful permanent resident who pled guilty to a controlled substance violation that made him eligible for deportation. 85 At issue was a provision of the IIRIRA that appeared to
strip the Court of jurisdiction to review a pure question of law: whether St.
Cyr was eligible for a discretionary grant of relief from deportation. 86 The
Court found that construing the statute to preclude judicial review of a purely legal question raised serious constitutional concerns. 87
In reaching this conclusion, the Court reviewed historical precedents
and established that habeas review of questions of law was available to
noncitizens in deportation proceedings. 88 The Court held that this minimum
judicial review of deportation decisions is required by the Constitution and
cannot be foreclosed by Congress. 89 The Court thus reiterated the Suspension Clause’s important role as a separation-of-powers mechanism in which
habeas review functions as a judicial check on the deportation decisions
made by the executive. 90 Given the serious constitutional concerns raised by
the preclusion of habeas review for questions of law, the Court construed the
statute so as to not strip habeas jurisdiction. 91 Because the Court reached this
result without striking down the statute, it did not address the precise scope
of habeas review. 92
The Court did address the scope of the protections of the Suspension
Clause in Boumediene when considering noncitizen enemy combatants apprehended and detained outside the borders of the United States. 93 To determine if the statute at issue violated the Suspension Clause, the Court
established a two-step framework. The first step involved determining
whether the petitioners were entitled to Suspension Clause protection. In
making this determination, the Court derived three relevant factors: “(1) the

83 . See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); St . Cyr, 533 U.S. 289.
84 . Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2019).
85 . St . Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293.
86 . Id .
87 . Id . at 300.
88 . Id . at 307.
89 . Id . at 300 (citing Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235 (1953)).
90 . See id . at 301–08.
91 . Id . at 300.
92 . Id . at 301 n.18.
93 . See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 753 (2008) (noting that the United States was
exercising jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay).
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citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process
through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the
sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical
obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.” 94 Notably, consideration of petitioners’ entitlement to other constitutional protections was not included as one of the Court’s factors. This suggests a
recognition that habeas review is so foundational, its protections may extend
to noncitizens who lack other constitutional rights. The first step focused instead on the historical scope of habeas review and its importance as a mechanism for enforcing the separation of powers. 95 Using these factors, the
Court determined that noncitizens who are imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay
are entitled to Suspension Clause protections. 96 Although the detainees’ location outside the United States weighed against finding that they had habeas
rights, the rudimentary procedures through which they were designated as
enemy combatants and the lack of any significant obstacles to adjudicating
habeas petitions led the Court to conclude otherwise. 97
The second step of the inquiry determined whether the jurisdictionstripping provision was constitutional by asking whether “Congress has provided adequate substitute procedures for habeas corpus.” 98 The Court found
that, at a minimum, an adequate substitute must provide the prisoner “a
meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the
erroneous application or interpretation’ of relevant law.” 99 Accordingly, a reviewing court must have the ability to not only examine whether the prescribed procedures were lawful and followed in a given case but also evaluate
findings of fact. 100 The Court specified that the scope of review required by
the Suspension Clause would depend on the circumstances of a given case,
and particularly the rigor of the prior proceedings. 101
The Court held that the procedures provided to the detainees were not
an adequate substitute for habeas review because of the constraints on the
detainees’ ability to rebut the factual determinations the government had
made against them. 102 This was due to several factors: the detainees had
“limited means to find or present evidence to challenge the Government’s
case[,] [they did] not have the assistance of counsel[,] and may not [have]
be[en] aware of the most critical allegations that the Government relied upon to order [their] detention.” 103 In light of these constraints, the Court rec94 .
95 .
96 .
97 .
98 .
99 .
100 .
101 .
102 .
103 .

Id . at 766.
See id . at 765.
Id . at 771.
Id . at 766–71.
Id . at 771.
Id . at 779 (emphasis added) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001)).
See id . at 788–89.
Id . at 779.
Id . at 783, 787.
Id . at 783–84.
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ognized the high risk that the tribunal would make erroneous findings of
fact. 104 Because of the high risk of error and the severe consequences of an
error, the Court held that the detainees must be entitled to habeas review or
an adequate substitute to remedy errors when they occur. 105 This decision
was critical because it was the first time the Court found a procedural substitute inadequate, and thus the first time the Court spoke directly to what the
Suspension Clause protects. 106
Even though the petitioners in St . Cyr and Boumediene were differently
situated than asylum seekers mistakenly subjected to expedited removal, the
reasoning used in both cases and the general framework the Court established in Boumediene provide the relevant legal backdrop for Suspension
Clause challenges to expedited removal. 107 St . Cyr and Boumediene involved
noncitizens very differently situated from each other, and yet the core of the
Court’s analysis in both cases was similar. Each focused on the Suspension
Clause’s historical scope and the critical role of the Suspension Clause in
maintaining the separation of powers. The same history and separation-ofpowers concerns that animate the Suspension Clause should inform the answer to whether noncitizens in expedited removal are entitled to habeas
rights.
II.

CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE REACH OF THE SUSPENSION
CLAUSE

Given the lack of Supreme Court precedent on point, circuit courts have
reached diverging conclusions on the extension of habeas rights to noncitizens in the United States. In Castro v . Department of Homeland Security, the
Third Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to address the Suspension
Clause rights of noncitizens in expedited removal. 108 In addressing this novel
issue, the court found that these asylum seekers were not entitled to habeas
rights and thus upheld the jurisdiction-stripping provision. 109 Subsequently,
in Thuraissigiam v . Department of Homeland Security, the Ninth Circuit
reached the opposite conclusion. There, the court held that asylum seekers
within the boundaries of the United States are entitled to habeas rights and

104 . Id . at 785.
105 . Id . at 792.
106. Neuman, supra note 62, at 538–39.
107 . See, e .g ., Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 893 F.3d 153, 166 (3d Cir. 2018)
(applying the Boumediene steps to determine whether petitioners were prohibited from invoking the Suspension Clause).
108 . See Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 425 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting
that the question whether the expedited removal statute violated the Suspension Clause rights
of noncitizens was a “very difficult question that neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has
addressed”).
109 . Id .
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that expedited removal does not adequately honor those rights. 110 This Part
asserts that the Ninth Circuit’s holding is correct in light of the purpose of
the Suspension Clause and Supreme Court habeas precedent. Section II.A
explores the facts of Castro and Thuraissigiam and the approach each circuit
adopted in assessing habeas rights. Section II.B argues that Suspension
Clause history and precedent support the conclusion that all noncitizens in
expedited removal are entitled to habeas rights. Section II.C addresses the
policy concerns that support this Note’s proposal that asylum seekers erroneously subjected to expedited removal are entitled to habeas review.
A. Alternative Approaches to the Suspension Clause Rights of Noncitizens
The Third and Ninth Circuits, despite facing similar facts, adopted different approaches to determining noncitizen entitlement to Suspension
Clause rights that lead to different outcomes. The petitioners in both Castro
and Thuraissigiam were asylum seekers who were apprehended within hours
of entering the country and detained fairly close to the border. 111 The petitioners in Castro were twenty-eight families, including women and their
children, who fled brutal gang and domestic violence in Central America. 112
The petitioner in Thuraissigiam was a man who fled Sri Lanka after being
tortured because of his political views. 113 Upon apprehension, CBP officers
determined that each asylum seeker was subject to expedited removal. 114
When the petitioners expressed a fear of returning home, they were referred
to asylum officers who conducted credible fear interviews. 115 The asylum officers determined that none of the petitioners had credible fears. 116 The petitioners then requested de novo review of these determinations in front of
IJs. 117 The IJs upheld the negative credible fear determinations, and the petitioners were transferred for removal without further review. 118 Each petitioner then filed a habeas petition in federal district court challenging their
credible fear determinations. 119 Since the jurisdiction-stripping provision

110 . See Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1116–17 (9th Cir.
2019).
111 . Id . at 1101; Castro, 835 F.3d at 427.
112 . Castro, 835 F.3d at 424, 427.
113 . Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1101–02.
114 . See id . at 1101; Castro, 835 F.3d at 428.
115 . Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1101; Castro, 835 F.3d at 428.
116 . Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1101; Castro, 835 F.3d at 428.
117 . Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1102; Castro, 835 F.3d at 428. See generally 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III) (2012) (“The Attorney General shall provide by regulation and upon
the alien’s request for prompt review by an immigration judge of a determination under subclause (I) that the alien does not have a credible fear of persecution.”).
118 . Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1102; Castro, 835 F.3d at 428.
119 . Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1102; Castro, 835 F.3d at 428 (“Each petitioning family
then submitted a separate habeas petition to the District Court, each claiming that the asylum
officer and IJ conducting their credible fear interview and review violated their Fifth Amend-
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bars habeas review of the substantive issues raised in these petitions, the federal courts had to address whether this jurisdiction-stripping provision is
unconstitutional. This determination involved a preliminary question:
whether the petitioners were entitled to Suspension Clause protection at all.
In Castro, the Third Circuit held that the petitioners did not have any
constitutional rights, including habeas rights. 120 The court stressed that the
petitioners were recent, surreptitious entrants, which made them most analogous to noncitizens who are outside the borders of the country and accordingly lack all constitutional protections. 121 In reaching this conclusion, the
court relied heavily on the plenary power doctrine, which is an exercise in
extreme judicial deference regarding the procedures chosen by the political
branches for admitting and excluding noncitizens. 122 The court highlighted
the 1982 Supreme Court decision Landon v . Plasencia, which held that “an
alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and
has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit
or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.” 123 The Third Circuit reasoned
that because the petitioners were apprehended close to the border and so
soon after entry, they were essentially seeking initial admission and thus not
entitled to constitutional protections. 124
During the two years that Castro was litigated, four of the petitioner
children applied for and were granted Special Immigrant Juvenile Status
(SIJS), a classification that provides certain abused, abandoned, or neglected
children with enhanced statutory and regulatory rights, including eligibility
for lawful permanent residence. 125 These four children and their mothers
again filed habeas petitions challenging their expedited removal orders. 126 In
this new case, Osorio-Martinez v . Attorney General, the court found that
stripping habeas review violated the Suspension Clause. 127 The court conducted a thorough analysis of the statutory requirements for SIJS and determined that if the petitioners had satisfied these statutory requirements, they
had developed a connection with the United States that triggered constitutional protections. 128 But the court did not establish a clear test for when
ment procedural due process rights, as well as their rights under the INA . . . and the applicable
implementing regulations.” (footnote omitted)).
120 . Castro, 835 F.3d at 434–35, 445 (“Congress may, consonant with the Constitution,
deny habeas review in federal court of claims relating to an alien’s application for admission to
the country, at least as to aliens who have been denied initial entry or who, like Petitioners,
were apprehended very near the border and, essentially, immediately after surreptitious entry
into the country.”).
121 . Id . at 445–46.
122 . See id .
123. 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982); Castro, 835 F.3d at 444.
124 . Castro, 835 F.3d at 445.
125. Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 893 F.3d 153, 159–60 (3d Cir. 2018).
126 . Id . at 160.
127 . Id . at 166.
128 . Id . at 167–68.
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noncitizens become entitled to Suspension Clause protections. 129 The Third
Circuit’s decisions in Castro and Osorio-Martinez represent a case-by-case
approach to Suspension Clause protections that depends on an analysis of
the noncitizens’ connection to the United States.
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Thuraissigiam adopted a bright-line
rule that all noncitizens physically within the borders of the United States are
entitled to habeas rights. 130 To find that the petitioner had habeas rights, the
court relied on two principal arguments. First, it emphasized the purpose of
the Suspension Clause as enforcing the separation of powers. 131 It noted that
“the Suspension Clause protects ‘a right of first importance,’ even in circumstances . . . where the executive’s power is at its zenith.”132 Even where the
plenary powers have applied, the protections of the Suspension Clause have
not been suspended. 133 Accordingly, to deprive the noncitizens of habeas
rights would be an abdication of the courts’ responsibility to check executive
power. Second, the court cited historical precedent that extended habeas review even to newly arriving noncitizens. 134 Citing many of the same old English cases and early American cases as the Boumediene Court, the Ninth
Circuit positioned its holding as being aligned with a long chain of precedent. 135
B. Noncitizens in Expedited Removal Are Entitled to Suspension Clause
Protections
The constitutional rights of noncitizens at the border remain unsettled,
and the Supreme Court has never addressed whether noncitizens in expedited removal have habeas rights. 136 Though the Supreme Court has held that
noncitizens do not enjoy the full slate of rights guaranteed to U.S. citizens,
the Court has never addressed the narrower question whether noncitizens
facing expedited removal are entitled to habeas rights. The distinction is significant, because habeas rights are unique. Unlike other constitutional rights,

129 . Id . at 170 n.13 (“We need not address here what minimum requirements aliens must
meet to lay claim to constitutional protections. We hold merely that SIJ designation and the
relationship to the United States to which it attests are more than sufficient.”).
130 . See Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1115 (9th Cir.
2019).
131 . See id . at 1105.
132 . Id . at 1108 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008)).
133 . See Chloe Kim, Castro v. Department of Homeland Security: Keeping the Suspension
Clause Out of Reach, CALIF. L. REV.: BLOG (Sept. 2017), http://www.californialawreview.org
/keeping-the-suspension-clause-out-of-reach/ [https://perma.cc/46CV-V8GC] (“In fact, in all
the plenary power cases, the Court had to recognize the petitioners’ right to petition a writ of
habeas under the Suspension Clause in order to reach the question of whether their due process rights were violated.”).
134 . Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1115.
135 . Id . at 1109.
136. Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 448 (3d Cir. 2016).
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the constitutional right to habeas review has always been extended to noncitizens within the borders of the country. In fact, before the Third Circuit’s
decision in Castro, no federal court of appeals had ever denied the protections of the Suspension Clause to noncitizens within the country’s borders. 137 The core of this divergence in interpreting the reach of the
Suspension Clause originates from the tension between the plenary power
doctrine and the separation-of-powers doctrine.
The plenary power doctrine establishes that immigration matters are the
prerogative of the political branches as “a basic attribute of sovereignty.” 138
Accordingly, the Court has exercised extreme deference to the exclusion
procedures chosen by Congress. 139 Early cases that established the plenary
power doctrine left very little room for judicial review of immigration matters. 140 This was especially true in relation to noncitizens detained at ports of
entry, where the political branches’ plenary power was thought to be at its
apex. 141 Under the “entry fiction doctrine,” noncitizens detained at ports of
entry, though technically within the borders of the country, have the same
limited constitutional status as those outside the United States. 142 Asylum
seekers just inside the border would be most analogous to these noncitizens
at ports of entry. 143
But the Court’s habeas jurisprudence firmly establishes that the Suspension Clause entitles these recent entrants to habeas rights, regardless of what
the plenary power and entry fiction doctrines may provide. In any case,
those latter doctrines are likely inapplicable to asylum seekers. Because the
asylum seekers at issue are physically within the United States’ borders, rather than just outside of them at a port of entry, they fall outside the scope of
the entry fiction doctrine. Unlike those noncitizens stopped at a port of en-

137. Brief of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4, Castro, 835 F.3d 422 (No. 16-812).
138. Jon Feere, Plenary Power: Should Judges Control U .S . Immigration Policy?, CTR. FOR
IMMIGR. STUD. (Feb. 25, 2009), https://cis.org/Report/Plenary-Power-Should-Judges-ControlUS-Immigration-Policy [https://perma.cc/XH69-H859].
139 . See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel . Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (“But an
alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on a different footing: ‘Whatever the procedure
authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.’ ”
(quoting United States ex rel . Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950))); United States
v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 263 (1905).
140 . See, e .g ., Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 664 (1892); see also Castro, 835 F.3d at
441 (“Thus, the Court’s earliest plenary power decisions established a rule leaving essentially
no room for judicial intervention in immigration matters . . . .”).
141 . Castro, 835 F.3d at 442 (noting that Mezei and Knauff effectively reversed the impact
of the cases limiting the plenary power doctrine, at least in relation to those noncitizens subject
to the “entry fiction”).
142 . See Ju Toy, 198 U.S. at 263 (“The petitioner, although physically within our boundaries, is to be regarded as if he had been stopped at the limit of our jurisdiction and kept there
while his right to enter was under debate.”).
143 . See Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 893 F.3d 153, 175 (3d Cir. 2018).
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try, whose constitutional rights remain uncertain, 144 those within the territorial United States are entitled to at least minimal constitutional protections. 145 Furthermore, while the Court has upheld restrictions on the due
process rights of noncitizens stopped at ports of entry, 146 the Court has never
upheld restrictions on Suspension Clause protections. In fact, in each case
where the Supreme Court found that the due process rights of noncitizens
were properly restricted, it held that those noncitizens were entitled to habeas review; otherwise, the Court would not have had jurisdiction to consider
the other constitutional claims raised. 147
Moreover, plenary powers are never absolute and must be interpreted in
accordance with the Constitution’s dedication to safeguarding the separation
of powers. 148 The Court repeatedly recognized this limitation to the plenary
power doctrine during a period termed the “finality era,” a roughly sixtyyear period that lasted until the mid-twentieth century. 149 During the finality
era, Congress passed a variety of immigration statutes that explicitly rendered the executive’s deportation determinations final. Despite this instruction from Congress, the Court repeatedly recognized that the Constitution
mandated that these determinations be subject to habeas review. 150 Later, in
St . Cyr, the Court confirmed that the precise source of this constitutionally
required review is the Suspension Clause. 151
The Suspension Clause requires habeas review even when the executive
detention is justified by compelling circumstances and concerns a policy area
within the purview of the political branches. For example, in Boumediene,
the Court dealt with another area that is the prerogative of the political
branches—war powers. 152 Despite the government’s claim that a compelling

144 . See Castro, 835 F.3d at 446.
145 . See, e .g ., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“It is well established that certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to
aliens outside of our geographic borders. But once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”
(emphases added) (citations omitted)); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
146 . See, e .g ., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (upholding limitations on the due
process rights of noncitizens).
147 . See Kim, supra note 133.
148 . See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Applying the Suspension Clause to Immigration Cases, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1068, 1090–91 (1998) (“And surely Congress could not, under the Constitution, provide for the summary torture of some illegal immigrants as a deterrent to unlawful
entries by others. Once such modest limits are acknowledged, it becomes clear that there is
nothing radical in the proposition—which indeed is implicitly recognized already—that governmental powers under the Constitution can be more or less, but never absolutely, plenary.”).
149 . See Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1114–15 (9th Cir.
2019).
150 . See, e .g ., Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235 (1953); Shaughnessy v. United States
ex rel . Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212–13 (1953).
151. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300 (2001).
152 . See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745 (2008).
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state interest in protecting the country from terrorism warranted a suspension of habeas rights for enemy combatants, the Court held that there was no
credible argument that the government’s “military mission at Guantanamo
would be compromised if habeas courts had jurisdiction.” 153 Likewise, the
government’s claims of compelling national security interests are insufficient
to justify the deprivation of habeas rights for asylum seekers. Granting prospective asylees these protections in no way threatens the safety and security
of Americans. 154 Rather, it would bolster the legitimacy of the immigration
system by providing an added layer of review, ensuring that asylees are not
summarily deported and forced to return to the persecution from which they
fled.
Although the political branches have control over the regulations implemented to exclude and admit noncitizens, the executive may not implement a procedure that dispenses with the judiciary’s role in reviewing
executive detention. The Suspension Clause was intended to “ensure[] that,
except during periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary will have a timetested device, the writ, to maintain the ‘delicate balance of governance’ that
is itself the surest safeguard of liberty.” 155 In the context of expedited removal, habeas review, or an adequate substitute, upholds the separation-ofpowers purpose by allowing the judiciary to serve as a check on executive detention and deportation decisions.
C. Policy Implications of Instituting Habeas Review for Noncitizens in
Expedited Removal
Policy concerns provide additional support for adopting the clear rule
that all asylum seekers within U.S. borders are entitled to habeas review. 156
As the Third Circuit’s decisions in Castro and Osorio-Martinez make clear,
drawing a line between which asylum seekers meet the “minimum requirements . . . to lay claim to” habeas rights and which do not is doctrinally diffi-

153 . Id . at 769.
154 . See Alex Nowrasteh, Does the Migrant Caravan Pose a Serious Terrorism Risk?,
CATO INST. (Oct. 23, 2018, 5:19 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/does-migrant-caravan-poseterrorism-risk [https://perma.cc/JD44-V4MT] (noting that annually, between 1975 and 2017,
there was only a one in 1.3 billion chance of being killed in a terrorist attack perpetrated by an
asylum seeker or undocumented immigrant).
155 . Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 745 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004)).
156. It is worth noting that a holding that all noncitizens in expedited removal are not
entitled to habeas review is foreclosed by the wide reach of expedited removal. Expedited removal can be applied to anyone in the United States who cannot establish physical presence for
the prior two years. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(1)(ii) (2018). Among those included in this sweeping
provision could be a noncitizen who has been in the United States for one year and 364 days or
someone who has been in the United States for many years but does not have documentation
of continual presence. But there is no question that both of these noncitizens are entitled to at
least some constitutional protections. See, e .g ., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
Since many noncitizens included in the sweep of expedited removal are entitled to constitutional protections, the Court could not hold that noncitizens are not entitled to habeas review.
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cult and has large human and judicial costs. 157 Although there is a clear status difference between SIJS designees and recent entrants, the distinction between categories of noncitizens will not always be so clear. For example, if an
asylum seeker has been in the country for one week and is thirty miles past
the border, will they be entitled to Suspension Clause rights? What about fifty miles past the border? Or one hundred miles past the border, having been
in the country for only two days? The Third Circuit’s approach raises these
difficult questions but provides no workable answer.
Because the Court has never suggested that entitlement to habeas depends on the number of hours a noncitizen has been present in the country
or how many miles within the country a noncitizen is apprehended, there is
no precedent for lower courts to rely on if forced to make these fact-specific
determinations. Thus, courts will not be able to easily apply this case-by-case
approach, and its implementation could strain judicial resources. Further,
even if a court does determine that an individual is entitled to Suspension
Clause rights, it must then determine whether expedited removal is an adequate substitute for habeas proceedings. 158 As Castro and Osorio-Martinez
demonstrate, determination of these issues can take years.
What is perhaps most problematic about this lengthy process of determining whether a given noncitizen is entitled to habeas review is that the
INA mandates that asylum seekers be detained during the credible fear process. 159 This means that asylum seekers—including families with young children, like the petitioners in Castro—may be kept in immigration detention
facilities for upwards of two years. 160 Indefinite detention is particularly concerning given the reports of heinous living conditions at detention centers
and evidence revealing the damaging mental and physical toll of lengthy
confinement. 161 Asylum seekers have described being held in jail-like facilities without adequate medical care, food, or educational services. 162 Additionally, detaining asylum seekers financially burdens taxpayers. 163 The cost

157. Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 893 F.3d 153, 170 n.13 (3d Cir. 2018).
158. For example, the district court in Castro found that the petitioners had Suspension
Clause rights, but they were limited in scope, so expedited removal was an adequate substitute.
Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 163 F. Supp. 3d 157, 168 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
159 . See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (2012).
160 . See Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 179 n.24 (noting that the petitioners were detained
for nearly two years).
161. Andrew Gumbel, ‘They Were Laughing at Us’: Immigrants Tell of Cruelty, Illness and
Filth in US Detention, GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2018/sep/12/us-immigration-detention-facilities [https://perma.cc/4W73-CHKG].
162. DET. WATCH NETWORK, EXPOSE & CLOSE: ARTESIA FAMILY RESIDENTIAL CENTER,
NEW
MEXICO
(2014),
https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/default/files
/reports/DWN%20Expose%20and%20Close%20Artesia%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/3HZS-W44A].
163. Eagly et al., supra note 47, at 802 (noting that in 2017, the federal budget for immigration detention was set at $1.748 billion).
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of detaining a noncitizen for a day is $126. 164 When these numbers are multiplied by the number of asylum seekers who find themselves at risk of being
subject to expedited removal and the possibility of multi-year detentions, the
costs are staggering.
A clear rule that all noncitizens physically within the United States are
entitled to habeas rights would reduce the fiscal and human toll of extended
detention. In each case, instead of litigating the question whether a given
noncitizen is entitled to habeas review, the district court can either issue or
deny the writ based on the merits of the challenge to the credible fear determination and then either affirm or reverse the determination.
Finally, the suggestion that some asylum seekers may not be entitled to
habeas review raises serious concerns in light of evidence of thousands of erroneous deportations. 165 For asylum seekers who fled their home countries
due to fear of persecution, deportation may amount to a death sentence. 166
As Elena’s story demonstrates, when immigration officers fail to adequately
identify an individual as an asylum seeker, that person is sent back to face
horrific persecution. 167 Some asylum seekers are quite literally sent home to
their deaths. 168 The consequences associated with erroneous deportations are
inherent in every claim for asylum, not just those of asylum seekers who are
found sufficiently far inside the border of the United States. In light of these
weighty policy concerns, the guidance provided by the Court’s habeas jurisprudence, and the historical purpose of habeas, all asylum seekers in the
United States should be entitled to habeas review.
III. SUSPENSION CLAUSE RIGHTS OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN PRACTICE:
HABEAS OR AN ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE
Numerous scholars have argued that noncitizens subject to expedited
removal are entitled to the protection of the Suspension Clause, 169 but there
has been little discussion about what follows from that conclusion. In both
Thuraissigiam and Osorio-Martinez, the courts found that the jurisdictionstripping provision violates the Suspension Clause. 170 Both courts drew on
Boumediene for the proposition that, at a minimum, an adequate substitute
for habeas rights must allow for “meaningful review of both the cause for de-

164 . Id .
165 . Cf . Meredith Hoffman, The US Keeps Mistakenly Deporting Its Own Citizens, VICE
NEWS (Mar. 8, 2016), https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/pa4mq7/the-us-keeps-mistakenlydeporting-its-own-citizens [https://perma.cc/NF5L-2RH7] (noting that over 4,000 U.S. citizens
were erroneously deported in 2010).
166. Stillman, supra note 2 (discussing several stories of asylum seekers deported back to
their deaths).
167 . Id .
168 . Id .
169 . See, e .g ., Neuman, supra note 62, at 571, 577.
170. Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1119 (9th Cir. 2019);
Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 893 F.3d 153, 178 (3d Cir. 2018).
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tention and the Executive’s power to detain.” 171 Because the jurisdictionstripping provision does not permit review of whether the expedited removal
statute was lawfully applied to the petitioners, it is blatantly an inadequate
substitute. 172 But even after finding the provision unconstitutional as applied
to the petitioners, neither court fully addressed the implications of its holding.
This Note argues that asylum seekers in the United States—especially
those improperly placed in expedited removal proceedings—are entitled to
habeas rights. Under Boumediene, these asylum seekers must have access to
either habeas review itself or a congressionally created adequate substitute.
Both paths are worth probing: If Congress fails to act, the question remains
as to how, precisely, federal district courts should conduct habeas proceedings and what types of relief would be appropriate. Alternatively, if Congress
does attempt to create a substitute procedure in place of habeas proceedings,
what safeguards are required to ensure that the substitute is adequate? This
Part explores these alternative options and what each would look like in
practice. Section III.A uses the Court’s reasoning in St . Cyr and Boumediene
to argue that the habeas court must be able to review questions of law and
fact and grant conditional release. Section III.B proposes reforms to expedited removal that would make it an adequate substitute for habeas review. Section III.C addresses the costs associated with an adequate substitute and
proposes several practical solutions to mitigate those costs.
A. Habeas Review in Expedited Removal
Traditionally, the scope of habeas review has extended to review of questions of law and, in certain circumstances, questions of fact. The jurisdictionstripping provision, as written, precludes review of both questions of law and
fact. This inability to review questions of law clearly violates the Suspension
Clause. 173 To be sure, the court must have the ability to consider “whether
the expedited removal statute was lawfully applied to petitioners,” 174 including whether there has been an “ ‘erroneous application or interpretation’ of
relevant law.” 175 In these cases, a judge must consider whether expedited removal was applied to an asylum seeker with a credible fear, because such
noncitizens cannot lawfully be subjected to expedited removal. 176 Currently,
this level of review is inaccessible. If changed, a habeas court would be able

171. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 783 (2008).
172 . Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 177 (noting that § 1252 only allows review of whether
an immigration officer issued the order of removal and if that order was for the petitioner).
173. Neuman, supra note 62, at 577.
174 . Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 177 (quoting Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
835 F.3d 422, 432 (3d Cir. 2016)).
175 . Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001)).
176 . See 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2012).
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to review whether the immigration officials complied with the required procedures and “applied the correct legal standards.” 177
The necessary scope of factual habeas review is a function of the earlier
proceedings’ rigor. 178 Decisions generated by executive proceedings should
be subjected to more exacting judicial review than convictions by a court of
record. 179 Even so, in reviewing decisions generated in regular removal proceedings, habeas courts consider questions of fact under the deferential
standard of “some evidence” review. 180 The minimalist nature of expedited
removal proceedings, “which give aliens no opportunity to be represented
(even at their own expense), no opportunity to present witnesses, and no
opportunity to obtain documents that they were not carrying when arrested,” weighs in favor of more exacting review than in regular removal proceedings. 181 Looking at the “sum total of procedural protections afforded” 182
leads to the conclusion that fuller factual review after the fact is warranted to
ensure accurate outcomes given the relative absence of initial procedural
protections. 183
The ability to review questions of law and fact is necessary because asylum seekers are not receiving fair adversary proceedings. 184 Specifically, on
habeas review an asylum seeker must be allowed to introduce relevant evidence. 185 Considering this evidence, which may not have been provided at an
earlier stage, the court will be able to assess whether the asylum seeker has a
“significant probability” of qualifying for asylum. 186 As in St . Cyr, the habeas
court is not reviewing a discretionary decision itself—here a grant of asylum—but instead is reviewing a nondiscretionary decision: whether an individual is eligible to seek asylum in regular removal proceedings. 187 Habeas
review would ensure that noncitizens who have legitimate asylum claims are
entitled to the procedural protections guaranteed by INA section 240. 188

177. Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1118 (9th Cir. 2019).
178 . Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 782–83.
179 . Id .
180 . See Neuman, supra note 62, at 576. See generally INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 306
(2001) (explaining that “some evidence” review consists of looking to see whether the order
was supported by some evidence).
181. Neuman, supra note 62, at 576.
182 . Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783.
183. Neuman, supra note 62, at 576.
184 . Cf . Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 782 (“Both aspects of federal habeas corpus review are
justified because it can be assumed that, in the usual course, a court of record provides defendants with a fair, adversary proceeding.”).
185 . See id . at 786 (“Federal habeas petitioners long have had the means to supplement
the record on review, even in the postconviction habeas setting.”).
186 . See id . (noting that the habeas court must have “some authority to assess the sufficiency of the Government’s evidence” against the noncitizen).
187 . See id .
188 . See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2012).
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Asylum seekers must be able to vindicate their right to a fair credible
fear proceeding. Habeas review would provide a judicial backstop in situations where an asylum officer improperly makes a negative credible fear determination for a bona fide asylum seeker. In these situations, a habeas court
could essentially reverse the asylum officer’s negative credible fear determination if it determined that the asylum seeker demonstrated a “significant
probability” of qualifying for asylum. The habeas court would then need to
determine the appropriate remedy.
First and foremost, a habeas court would allow the asylum seeker to
make their case in traditional, nonexpedited section 240 removal proceedings. In doing so, the habeas court would remove the asylum seeker from expedited removal proceedings and eliminate the prospect of a fast-track
deportation. Further, as the Court noted in Boumediene, habeas courts must
be empowered “to order the conditional release of an individual unlawfully
detained—though release need not be the exclusive remedy and is not the
appropriate one in every case.” 189 Asylum seekers should be granted conditional release as they await their formal section 240 removal proceedings.
The risk of flight is low: studies have shown that 95 percent of those with
asylum claims who are released from detention attend all of their hearings.190
If Congress enacts an adequate substitute for habeas review, the scope of
such review may be narrowed, but if Congress retains expedited removal in
its current form, the habeas court must be able to review questions of law
and fact and have the authority to grant conditional release.
B. What Would an Adequate Substitute Look Like?
Congress may restrict access to habeas review only if it enacts an adequate and effective substitute. 191 As Thuraissigiam and Osorio-Martinez
demonstrate, expedited removal in its current form is not an adequate or effective substitute. 192 In fact, this was so clear that the courts did not feel the
need to engage in an analysis of what an adequate substitute might include. 193 In Boumediene, the Court was troubled by the constraints on the
detainees’ ability to rebut the factual determinations the government had
made against them. 194 Of particular concern was that “the detainee[s] [had]
limited means to find or present evidence to challenge the Government’s
case, [did] not have the assistance of counsel, and may not [have] be[en]
aware of the most critical allegations that the Government relied upon to or-

189 . Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779.
190 . See Eagly et al., supra note 47, at 847 fig.15.
191 . See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977).
192. Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1118 (9th Cir. 2019);
Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 893 F.3d 153, 177 (3d Cir. 2018).
193 . Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 177 n.22.
194 . See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 784.
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der his detention.” 195 Each of these concerns arises in expedited removal as
well.
In credible fear interviews, asylum officers must make a factual determination about whether a noncitizen has a credible fear of returning home. A
negative credible fear determination—barring an unlikely reversal by an IJ—
will push the noncitizen into expedited removal and imminent deportation. 196 As currently implemented, expedited removal does not provide asylum seekers with an adequate and effective opportunity to rebut this
determination. 197 Without this opportunity for asylum seekers to present
their case, there is a serious concern that executive officers will make erroneous findings of fact. Where these errors have such weighty consequences—
potentially death or, as in the case of Elena, further persecution—the lack of
judicial review is particularly concerning. 198
In order for expedited removal to serve as an adequate substitute, Congress must reform the IIRIRA. First, expedited removal as enacted prescribes
procedural protections that the executive is not implementing in practice. 199
The IIRIRA should be amended to allow habeas review to serve as a backstop
to ensure “important oversight of whether DHS complied with the required
credible fear procedures.” 200 Second, Congress must provide counsel and the
opportunity to gather and present evidence to ensure that noncitizens can
adequately rebut the factual determinations being made against them. The
reforms suggested in this Part are largely framed as individual rights, but
they also serve the separation-of-powers purpose of the Suspension Clause
because more rigorous procedures reduce the risk of executive error and
therefore decrease the urgency of judicial review.
There are several procedural protections built into the expedited removal statute that, if fully implemented, would better allow noncitizens to rebut
the factual findings being made against them. First, the regulations implementing expedited removal require translation services for noncitizens who
do not speak English, 201 but there have been numerous reports that translation services are “often inadequate or wholly unavailable.” 202 Additionally,
although the INA mandates that asylum officers conducting credible fear interviews provide noncitizens with a written explanation for their determinations, 203 there is evidence that many asylum officers do not provide this

195 . Id .
196 . Findings of Credible Fear Plummet, supra note 55.
197 . See Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1116–17; Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 177.
198 . See Stillman, supra note 2.
199. Brief of Refugee & Human Rights Organizations & Scholars, supra note 16, at 17–18.
200 . Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1118.
201. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d)(5) (2019).
202. Brief of Refugee & Human Rights Organizations & Scholars, supra note 16, at 14–15
(noting that mistranslation essentially nullifies the right to express a credible fear).
203. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(II) (2012).
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requisite analysis. 204 Furthermore, noncitizens are not given their statutory
right to present evidence or be heard at their hearings, 205 and this issue is
compounded when adjudicators apply an erroneously high legal standard for
establishing a credible fear. 206 Taken together, these errors prevent bona fide
asylum seekers from being accurately identified and from understanding the
findings that have been made against them. It is difficult for legitimate asylum seekers to adequately contest their negative credible fear determination 207 because they will often not be aware of even the most critical findings
made by the asylum officer.
There is also evidence that IJs are not adhering to the procedural protections prescribed by the expedited removal statute. IJs are required to provide
independent review of asylum seekers’ cases, but there is evidence that IJs
merely rubber-stamp asylum officer determinations. 208 Because IJs are evaluated based on the speed and efficiency with which they process cases 209 and
face pressure to adhere to the executive’s political agenda, 210 the incentives to
defer to the negative credible fear determinations of asylum officers are
weighty. IJs have begun to make categorical determinations regarding types
of asylum claims, rather than analyzing each case based on its facts, even
though this practice has been rejected by the federal courts. 211 Given the evidence that the executive branch is not adhering to the procedures enacted by
Congress, Congress must create an oversight mechanism. This oversight
could take the form of adding a provision to expedited removal that allows
for habeas review of whether the executive complied with the required procedures. Such a provision would create judicial oversight of both asylum of-

204 . See Brief of Refugee & Human Rights Organizations & Scholars, supra note 16, at
17–18 (“As Petitioners’ cases demonstrate, asylum officers often issue a boilerplate form and
simply check a box indicating that a noncitizen failed to meet a particular legal requirement.”).
205 . See, e .g ., Jeffrey S. Chase, Attorneys and Credible Fear Review, OPINIONS/ANALYSIS
ON IMMIGR. L. (July 22, 2018), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/7/22/attorneys-andcredible-fear-review [https://perma.cc/4APD-LL87].
206 . See Anneliese Hermann, Asylum in the Trump Era, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June
13, 2018, 9:02 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2018/06
/13/452025/asylum-trump-era/ [https://perma.cc/B8FN-T7B4].
207 . See Brief of Refugee & Human Rights Organizations & Scholars, supra note 16, at
17–18.
208. Weissert & Schmall, supra note 57.
209. Tal Kopan, Justice Department Rolls Out Case Quotas for Immigration Judges, CNN
(Apr. 2, 2018, 8:55 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/02/politics/immigration-judges-quota
/index.html [https://perma.cc/DP2L-TWHM] (“Creating an environment where the courts
care more about the speed than the accuracy, and where judges are evaluated and even rewarded based on quantity rather than quality is unacceptable and a violation of due process . . . .”
(quoting Laura Lynch)).
210 . See Weissert & Schmall, supra note 57.
211 . See, e .g ., Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2018); Ted Hesson, Judge
Strikes Down Trump Policy Blocking Domestic Violence Victims from Asylum, POLITICO (Dec.
19, 2018, 12:30 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/19/trump-policy-domesticviolence-victims-asylum-1069107 [https://perma.cc/F4HB-TQ5R].
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ficers’ and IJs’ actions. Enforced adherence to these procedural protections
would mitigate the need for federal judicial review. But further changes to
expedited removal are necessary even with this judicial oversight because
noncitizens need to be able to adequately contest the government’s findings
against them.
Another constraint on asylum seekers’ ability to rebut the government’s
findings is their “limited means to find or present evidence to challenge the
Government’s case.” 212 Notice and a meaningful opportunity to gather necessary evidence are, at a minimum, composed of two elements—time (ideally
outside of detention) and legal counsel. 213 Although expedited removal proceedings are meant to be expeditious, it is often impracticable for noncitizens to gather the evidence necessary to satisfy the asylum officer and IJ in
such a short time frame. Additionally, detention makes it more difficult, if
not impossible, for noncitizens to collect necessary evidence or prepare to
testify themselves. 214 There is a growing body of research showing that detention conditions are atrocious and may lead to retraumatization and severe
mental health problems for detained asylum seekers. 215 Traumatized asylum
seekers may not be able to accurately convey their stories to asylum officers
or IJs. 216 Congress should therefore amend the IIRIRA to remove the mandatory detention provision (8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV)) and allow for
more time between the initial credible fear interview and IJ review if requested. As in Boumediene, the asylum seeker’s “ability to rebut the Government’s
evidence against him is limited by the circumstances of his confinement and
his lack of counsel.” 217
The Court in Boumediene emphasized that legal counsel is critical to an
adequate substitute for habeas review. 218 For asylum seekers to truly understand what they need to prove their claim and how to prove it, Congress
must amend the IIRIRA to provide access to legal counsel to noncitizens in
expedited removal. It is a fundamental principle in American law that a

212 . See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 783 (2008).
213 . See id . at 767 (“[H]is ability to rebut the Government’s evidence against him is limited by the circumstances of his confinement and his lack of counsel . . . .”).
214. ELEANOR ACER & JESSICA CHICCO, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, U.S. DETENTION OF
ASYLUM SEEKERS: SEEKING PROTECTION, FINDING PRISON 7 (2009), https://www.humanrights
first.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/090429-RP-hrf-asylum-detention-report.pdf [https://perma
.cc/66XZ-ZG5Z].
215 . See ELIZABETH CASSIDY & TIFFANY LYNCH, U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM, BARRIERS TO PROTECTION: THE TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED
REMOVAL 38–39 (2016) [hereinafter BARRIERS TO PROTECTION], https://www.uscirf.gov/sites
/default/files/Barriers%20To%20Protection.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UVM-MKSX] (noting that
in FY 2013, 193,032 noncitizens were expeditiously removed).
216 . See PRIMER ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL, supra note 15.
217 . Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 767.
218 . See id .
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criminal hearing cannot be fair without access to legal counsel. 219 As the Supreme Court famously stated in Powell v . Alabama, “[t]he right to be heard
would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to
be heard by counsel.” 220 Although immigration cases are civil rather than
criminal, the adversarial nature of the proceedings and the weighty consequences are the precise aspects of the criminal proceedings that prompted
the Court to declare the importance of legal counsel. 221 In the case of expedited removal, noncitizens have the statutory right to be heard, 222 but that
right is of little avail without legal representation. The impact of legal representation is undeniable. Statistics show that asylum seekers are five times
more likely to succeed on their asylum claims if represented by a lawyer. 223
Some observers have gone so far as to conclude that legal representation is
“almost a necessity for winning asylum.” 224
Asylum law is notoriously complex, 225 and it is unreasonable to expect
that pro se asylum seekers would understand what is required for them to
prove their claims. Given the critical role of lawyers, the Boumediene Court
held that legal representation is necessary to an adequate and effective substitute for habeas review. 226 Further, providing legal counsel would not only
lead to more robust proceedings but also save time during those proceedings. A lawyer can listen to the asylum seeker’s testimony and then help
them formulate their claim and obtain relevant corroborating evidence. This
would allow for greater focus during both the initial credible fear interview
and subsequent de novo IJ review, as the lawyer could clearly frame the asylum seeker’s claim for the adjudicator. 227 The adjudicator bears the burden

219 . Cf . Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“[I]n our adversary system of
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth.
Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish
machinery to try defendants accused of crime.”).
220. 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932).
221 . See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365–66 (2010) (noting that although immigration proceedings are civil, “deportation is nevertheless intimately related to the criminal process”); INGRID EAGLY & STEVEN SHAFER, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN
IMMIGRATION COURT 1 (2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default
/files/research/access_to_counsel_in_immigration_court.pdf [https://perma.cc/GTS3-XT5H].
222. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III) (2012).
223 . Continued Rise in Asylum Denial Rates: Impact of Representation and Nationality,
TRAC IMMIGR. (Dec. 13, 2016), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/448/ [https://
perma.cc/HQE2-69E2].
224 . Id .
225 . See BARRIERS TO PROTECTION, supra note 215, at 53.
226 . See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 783–87 (2008).
227 . See BARRIERS TO PROTECTION, supra note 215, at 53 (“Lack of counsel not only disadvantages detainees but also burdens the system, since unrepresented cases are more difficult
and time consuming for adjudicators to decide.”).
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of developing the requisite factual record, 228 and a lawyer’s presence could
expedite the interview or hearing by directing the adjudicator toward the relevant facts and evidence.
In sum, if Congress chooses to continue restricting access to habeas review for noncitizens subject to expedited removal, it must enact an adequate
and effective substitute. An adequate and effective substitute in this context
must include habeas review of executive compliance with expedited removal
procedures, provision of legal counsel, and reduced constraints on noncitizens’ ability to obtain and present evidence.
C. Addressing the Costs Associated with an Adequate Substitute
The costs that these procedures would impose on both the executive and
the judiciary are not insignificant. In fact, these costs present the strongest
argument against finding that noncitizens subject to expedited removal are
entitled to habeas protections. Reviewing habeas petitions would strain judicial resources, and the suggested reforms to expedited removal would require an increase in expenditures by the executive. But the Court has found
that such costs are not dispositive. 229 For example, the costs of the decision
in Boumediene were not minimal. The decision was made during the height
of the war on terror, and the government was faced with the weighty task of
preventing acts of terrorism. 230 The Court recognized that “[h]abeas corpus
proceedings may require expenditure of funds by the Government and may
divert the attention of military personnel from other pressing tasks.” 231 In
the context of expedited removal, there are serious concerns about resources
and efficiency in processing noncitizens’ claims. But these are analogous to
the concerns that the Court specifically held were not determinative of the
reach and scope of the Suspension Clause in Boumediene. 232 The costs associated with habeas review or reforming expedited removal to make it an adequate substitute are also far less than recent immigration policies like
military deployment to the border. 233

228. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(II) (2012); cf . Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 877 (9th
Cir. 2002) (“Because aliens appearing pro se often lack the legal knowledge to navigate their
way successfully through the morass of immigration law, and because their failure to do so
successfully might result in their expulsion from this country, it is critical that the IJ ‘scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all the relevant facts.’ ” (quoting Jacinto v. INS, 208 F.3d 725, 733 (9th Cir. 2000))).
229 . See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 769.
230 . See id . at 796.
231 . Id . at 769.
232 . See id . (“While we are sensitive to these concerns, we do not find them dispositive.
Compliance with any judicial process requires some incremental expenditure of resources.”).
233. See Maya Rhodan, The Number of Asylum Seekers Has Risen by 2,000% in 10 Years .
Who Should Get to Stay?, TIME (Nov. 14, 2018), http://time.com/longform/asylum-seekersborder/ [https://perma.cc/U4JY-SMJY] (estimating that this military deployment cost the government between $42 and $110 million).
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Further, there are ways to create a more robust expedited removal regime that will reduce the need for federal habeas review without putting an
insurmountable burden on the executive. 234 Asylum officers could be given
the authority to grant asylum at the credible fear stage in certain circumstances. 235 If the asylum officer determines that the claim is likely meritorious but needs more development, the claim could be referred to an asylum
office rather than the immigration court. 236 Diverting those applicants who
have been determined likely to be successful on the merits of their claims
would reduce the burden placed on the immigration courts. Though this
proposal would require hiring new asylum officers, it would still cost the
government less than hiring new IJs. Asylum officers only need to be trained
in asylum law, whereas IJs need to be trained in all areas of immigration law.
In addition, the government may reduce the burden imposed by these
reforms by increasing use of the expedited removal provision allowing for
discretionary grants of voluntary withdrawal of application for admission. 237
When asylum officers make negative credible fear determinations, they can
present noncitizens with two options. One option is the appeals process—
officers would explain the process as well as the consequences of failure on
appeal. When a noncitizen fails on appeal and an order of removal is entered, there is a five-year bar on reentry and a permanent bar on applying for
asylum. 238 Asylum officers may also use their discretion to present a second
option: voluntary withdrawal of the noncitizen’s admission application. 239
This option results in immediate deportation but no order for removal. 240 If
the noncitizen voluntarily accepts the grant of voluntary withdrawal of application for admission, there is no need for further proceedings. This would
deter those without legitimate asylum claims from filing frivolous habeas petitions.
If Congress were to enact these suggested reforms, expedited removal
could be an adequate substitute for habeas review, and individual recourse to
habeas could be retained as solely a backstop to ensure executive compliance
with legislation. These reforms, although implemented at the individual level, serve the broader purpose of a check on executive action. As expedited

234 . See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 776.
235 . See BARRIERS TO PROTECTION, supra note 215, at 54 (“Asylum officers have the legal
background and training to adjudicate asylum claims, and do so for affirmative asylum cases.”).
236 . See, e .g ., Minor Children Applying for Asylum by Themselves, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/minor-chil
dren-applying-asylum-themselves [https://perma.cc/M2XQ-GUZG] (noting that asylum officers regularly adjudicate asylum claims with affirmative asylum filings).
237 . See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4) (2012).
238. BARRIERS TO PROTECTION, supra note 215, at 12.
239 . See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4).
240 . See Sarah E. Murphy, Withdrawal of Application for Admission, BORDER IMMIGR.
LAW., http://www.borderimmigrationlawyer.com/withdrawal-of-application-for/ [https://
perma.cc/KZ6Y-5M4Z].

February 2020]

Habeas Review of Expedited Removal Decisions

685

removal procedures become more rigorous, confidence in the accuracy of
the factual determinations generated by low-level immigration officers
would increase. If immigration officers are accurately identifying bona fide
asylum seekers rather than sending them back to persecution, the urgency of
judicial review diminishes.
CONCLUSION
By foreclosing habeas review of credible fear determinations, Congress
has violated the Suspension Clause rights of asylum seekers who are within
the borders of this country. In light of the historic purpose of the Suspension
Clause and recent Supreme Court precedent on the habeas rights of noncitizens, the Court should recognize that asylum seekers physically in the United States are entitled to habeas rights. Since these asylum seekers are
protected by the Suspension Clause, Congress may only strip the courts of
habeas jurisdiction if it enacts an adequate substitute for habeas review—
something that expedited removal currently is not. Accordingly, asylum
seekers must be entitled to habeas review.
It is possible that expedited removal, if reformed, could serve as an adequate substitute, diminishing the need for habeas review. But first, Congress
must add a provision to expedited removal allowing for habeas review of executive compliance with the credible fear procedures both in the initial credible fear interview and subsequent IJ review. In addition, with habeas review
as a backstop, the statute must be amended to provide legal counsel and adequate time to gather evidence to noncitizens during the credible fear proceedings. The enactment of more rigorous proceedings would mitigate the
serious separation-of-powers concerns currently arising from expedited removal. Such procedures would increase the executive’s accuracy in identifying bona fide asylum seekers and accordingly diminish the need for judicial
review. But without congressional reform of expedited removal, habeas review is a necessary and critical judicial check on the executive’s erroneous
interpretation and application of the law leading to the detention and deportation of bona fide asylum seekers.
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